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Abstract
This article studies the behavior of a rm searching to ll a vacancy.
The main assumption is that the rm can o¤er two di¤erent kinds of
contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one.
The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the rm
can learn the workers type. After this stage, the rm can propose a long-
term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker.
We show that, if the short-term wage is xed endogenously, for the rms
can be optimal to start a working relationship with a short-term contract,
but that this policy has a negative impact on unemployment and welfare.
On the contrary, if this wage is xed exogenously, this policy could be
optimal also from welfare point of view.
Keywords: Search, Temporary Employment, Short-Term Wage.
JEL Classication: J31, J41, J64.
DEIR, Università degli Studi di Sassari, via Torre Tonda 34, 07100 Sassari (Italy),
dpaolini@uniss.it
yI would like to thank F. Bloch, S. Perelman, V. Vannetelbosch, T. Pietra, and especially,
G. Bloise for their helpful comments and discussions. Remaining errors are mine. The nancial
support of the Italian MIUR is gratefully acknowledged.
1
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the behavior of a rm searching to ll a vacancy. The
main assumption is that rms may o¤er two di¤erent kinds of contracts to
workers, either a short-term contract (STC)1 or a long-term one (LTC).
The empirical evidence shows that the share of temporary work in total
employment has been increasing in Europe in recent years. At the end of the
seventies, labor market regulations restricted temporary jobs to specic tasks,
characterized by large variations in production. These regulations have changed
somewhat since then and, in a number of European countries, it is now possible
to hire workers on a temporary basis even for jobs which are not characterized
by high output variability.
For instance, an OECD study shows that, while in 1983 only 4% of the
employees in the EC held temporary jobs, this share has risen to 10% by 1991.2
After 1991, the percentage has been increasing in some countries (e.g., Belgium
and Italy) and decreasing in others (e.g., Spain).
Temporary contracts are often considered a measure of labor market exi-
bility. They o¤er an instrument to ensure that the returns to the entrepreneurs
and the start-up and demise of rms are unconstrained by institutional rigidities
such as employment restriction legislation and trade union activity. In periods
of rapid technical change or high demand volatility, temporary contracts allow
rms to hire workers as they wish. In addition, STCs can also be viewed as
a screening device, which allows employers to observe the productivity of the
job-worker pair. In this perspective, job matches can be interpreted as expe-
rience good, in the tradition of Jovanovic (1979, 1984). From this viewpoint,
rms may use a STC as a probationary period, allowing them to select the right
worker for the job.
This second interpretation is consistent with the results of several empirical
studies. For instance, in their study of the duration pattern of STCs, based
1We will also refer to short-term contract as temporary contracts.
2See OECD (2002) for a detailed description of xed-term contract regulation in the OECD
countries.
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on micro data from the Spanish Labour Force Survey, Güell and Petrongolo
(2000) observe an important spike at duration around 1 year. This observation
supports the idea that STCs are used as a screening device: successful workers
obtain permanent renewals well before the legal limit of their contracts (3 years).
The authors also observe another spike in the hazard at 3 years, suggesting that
STCs also provide to some rms a cheap option for adjusting their employment
levels.
Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2000), using data from the British Household
Panel Survey, nd that temporary workers report lower levels of job satisfaction,
receive less training, and are paid less than their counterparts in permanent jobs.
Conversely, they nd that experience on STCs may lead to high wage growth if
the workers move to permanent full-time jobs. This is because workers who have
such contracts enjoy high returns to experience capital, once they acquire a
permanent job.
Also relevant are the results of Bentolila and Dolado (1994) and Bentolila
and Saint-Paul (1992). Using a panel of Spanish rms, they show that the
introduction of STCs is equivalent to a reduction in ring costs and that its
impact on unemployment is ambiguous.
In the more theoretical literature, Wasmer (1999) and Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002) have introduced temporary jobs in matching models based on
the classic equilibrium models of the labor market, built on Diamond (1982),
Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (2000).
Wasmer (1999), in a model with exogenous job destruction, shows that, in
periods of low growth, rms are more willing to use STCs and that this increases
employment. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), in a model with endogenous job
destruction, show that the combination of temporary jobs and ring restrictions
may be both ine¢ cient in terms of aggregate welfare and inadequate as a weapon
to ght unemployment. Their result follows from the fact that the share of
temporary jobs transformed into permanent jobs is decreasing in the level of
ring costs. This could explain the dramatic growth in temporary jobs in France,
Italy and Spain, countries characterized by high levels of employment protection.
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On the contrary, in the United States and Britain, countries with relatively low
levels of employment protection, the proportion of the workforce on xed term
contracts has been fairly stable.
The increase in the share of STCs has had many consequences. Notably,
it has a¤ected the bargaining position of workers, negatively for the employees
with short-term contracts, and possibly positively for the employees with long-
term contracts (see, Bentolila and Dolado, (1994)).
Here, we focus the analysis on the role of STCs as a screening device. That
is, we assume that the only way to determine the quality of a particular match
is to form the match and experience it. When this is the case, rms may use
STCs to select the right worker for the job.
Our model is related to Acemoglu (2001) and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
The rst author constructs a model where rms o¤er jobs of two di¤erent qual-
ities. He studies how the size of unemployment benets and minimum wages
a¤ects the equilibrium composition of good vs. bad jobs. The second paper
also studies the impact of unemployment benets on the economy in a model
with heterogenous agents. The authors assume that both rms and workers are
uniformly distributed along a circle and that a workers productivity depends
on the location of the rm, decreasing with the distance between worker and
rm.
As in this last paper, we construct a model with heterogeneous workers,
distributed on [0; 1], but with homogenous rms. Search costs are captured by
the discount factor. Moreover, we assume that, in each period, workers have an
exogenous probability to leave the market. In order to preserve the stationarity
of the typesdistribution in the labor market, we assume that there is an ex-
ogenous incoming ow in the search market of workers of the same quality. In
our economy, the only way to determine the quality of a particular match is to
form and experience it. That is, the initial STC acts as a probationary stage
to select the right workers.
In this framework, we study the rms optimal policy and its welfare impact.
When rms meet a worker for the rst time, they dont know his type. A policy
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is dened as the choice of the contract to o¤er to the heterogenous workers.
The rm has two possibilities: Either it only o¤ers long-term contracts or it
o¤ers a short-term contract to begin with, switching to a long-term one if it is
satised about the productivity of the job-workers pair. We assume that rms
post a long-term wage for the job and that workers either take it or leave it.
Moreover, at rst we assume that the short-term wage is xed exogenously,
independently of the workers type. In the last section, we consider the case
where the short-term wage is posted by the rms.
When the short-term wage is exogenous and su¢ ciently high, STCs can be
optimal for both rms and social welfare. This is because a high short-term wage
pushes every worker to accept a STC. As already mentioned, with this contract,
rms will be able to screen workers only hiring with a long-term contract the
most qualied. From a social welfare viewpoint, the screening has a negative
impact on unemployment, but it can be compensated by a higher productive
e¢ ciency.
When the short-term wage is posted by the rms (and we allow rms to
use contingent wages), at the equilibrium STC may be optimal for the rms.
STCs are protable only if the costs, due to the probability of being unmatched,
are compensated by the surplus from the long-term matching. The higher the
workersunemployment benets, the lower the surplus that it can be obtained
by waiting to nd a good worker. However, in this case STCs are never optimal
from a welfare viewpoint.
Moreover, we show that the regime with xed short-term wage dominates,
in terms of welfare, the regime with posted short-term wage, provided that the
short-term wage exceeds a threshold value.
We also establish that, when the short-term wage is exogenously given, the
STC wage is higher than the LTC one, which is equal to the workers reserva-
tion wage, given by the unemployment income. This is because unemployment
benets are the outside option of a workers faced with a STC. Similarly, the
exogenous short-term wage is the outside option of a worker faced with a LTC.
The model is formally introduced in Section 2. Sections 3.2 and 4 present the
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main results. Section 5 analyzes the welfare e¤ects of the two kinds of contracts.
2 The Model
2.1 Workers and Firms
Workers are characterized by a real-value parameter dening the workers type,
x, distributed according to a continuous distribution function F (x) with full
support on [0; 1]. Its density denoted by f(x).
Time is discrete and t = 0; 1; :::+1.  is the probability that a worker leaves
the market ("dies") when going from period t to period (t+ 1). We assume that,
in each period, new workers enter the market. Their types are distributed so
that the actual distribution of workers alive is time-invariant, i.e., a worker of
type x enters the market if and only if a worker of type x dies. This assumption
is strong, but it allows to keep the analysis su¢ ciently simple. The main results
of the paper are independent of it.
In each period rms and workers meet. Firms o¤er a job-contract pair and
workers can accept or reject the o¤er. If the o¤er is accepted, production takes
place. At the end of the period, wages are paid and output is sold.
As in Albrecht and Axel (1984), we assume that workers can earn di¤er-
ent levels of income when unemployed3 , b(x). However, while Albrecht and
Axel (1984) assume that homogenous workers can have just two possible levels
of unemployment incomes, here we assume that there is a continuum of un-
employment income levels, depending on workers types. More precisely, we
assume that unemployment income is proportional to the workers type, i.e.,
that b(x) = x, with  2 [0; 1].
We assume, there are M > N homogenous rms. At each moment of time,
a rm can have either a lled position or a vacancy.4 An active rm with a
3 It can be interpreted as including the value of leisure and home production, net of search
costs. This wide notion of unemployment income also justies the assumption that benets
are related to the type.
4We will assume that rms have not cost to open a vacancy, so that we can avoid limited
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lled position employs one worker and obtains a revenue selling its output.
If the position is lled, an exogenous layo¤ arrives at each period with prob-
ability  (this is because in each period t, matched worker dies with probability
). Moreover, we assume that, if a rm leaves the market, another rm en-
ters the market. These stationarity assumptions are convenient, because they
allow us to focus on the main point of the paper (the optimal choice of the
contract), avoiding unnecessary complexities. The main results are robust to
several alternative, and weaker, assumptions on this issue.
For simplicity, for each rm, the production function is:
Y = f(x) = x (1)
where x is the type of the worker and y the technology of the homogenous rms.
To simplify notation, we set y = 1.
If there is a vacancy, in each t, rms can create a position without cost.
At each meeting in the search market, rms are not able to observe the type
of the worker (hence, their unemployment income). We allow rms to o¤er a
probationary contract (lasting one period) to the workers. During this period,
rms learn their workers type and decide whether or not to o¤er him a long-
term contract.
All the agents (rms and workers) have a common discount factor, denoted
0    1. Impatience also captures search costs.
2.2 Search and Matching
Total employment is Na = N(1   ua), where N is the labor force and ua the
unemployment rate. Moreover, let va denotes the vacancy rate. These values
depend on a; the rms choice of the contract.
Unemployed workers are matched to the recruiting rms according to a sim-
ple random matching technology, , that is assumed to be independent of the
number of participants in the search market. The matching function exhibits
constant returns to scale.
liability issues.
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The rate at which rms nd an unemployed worker, denoted q, will de-
pend on , the matching technology, and on ua and va (rate of unemployed







In determining the optimal rmsbehavior, an important role is played by the
short-term wage wO: We will mostly focus on the more interesting and relevant
case when wO is exogenously given, for instance because is xed by law. The
last section of the paper will summarize the result for the case when rms also
post wO: Hence, from here we treat the short term wage wO as exogenous:
For a rm, a policy, a, is the choice of the contract to o¤er to the workers.
We assume that it is impossible for a rm to re a worker before the expiration
of the contract (or that to re a worker is innitely costly).
The rm has two possible policies:
(L) It supplies a long-term employment contract at a wage rate wL (x), con-
tingent on the type (a = L).
(SL) It supplies a short-term (one-period) contract to begin with, switching,
possibly, in the following period, a long-term employment contract at a
wage rate wSL (x), contingent on the type (a = SL).
The advantage of this last policy is that the rm will have full information
about the workers type when it o¤ers him the long-term contract.
Contracts are chosen by the rm so as to maximize its prot subject to the
participation of workers, corresponding to the expected utility of a worker not
accepting the contract.
Let
Va(x) = b(x) + (1  ) [Wa(x) + (1  )Va(x)] (2)
5Given that M > N; evidently v > u:
8
be the expected utility of a type-x unemployed with a 2 fL; SLg and x 2 [0; 1].
An (L) policy is fully characterized by a wage rate w, meaning that a worker
of type x will receive a wage wL(x). The expected utility for a worker is implic-
itly dened by
WL (x) = wL (x) +  (1  )WL (x) : (3)
Given our simple matching technology (and the assumption M > N), where 
is the probability of a workers receives a job o¤er, a worker accepts if and only
if WL (x)  V (x) : Let L be the (measurable) subset of workers accepting the
contract.
An (SL) contract is fully characterized by a short-term wage w0, a long-
term wage rate wSL(x) and a subset  of workers for which the rm is willing
to extend the contractual relation over the long-period. The expected utility of
for a worker is implicitly dened by
WSL (x) =
8<: w0 +  (1  )VSL (x) ; if x 62 ;w0 +  (1  )WL (x;w) if x 2  : (4)
Clearly, a worker accepts if and only if WSL (x)  VSL (x). Let SL be the
(measurable) subset of workers accepting the contract.
Now, when a rm supplies a contract, workers in SL accept and worker in
SL \  extend to the long-period one.
The Problem rmspolicy choice Knowing w0; wSL(x), wL(x)  and w0
we can dene the problem rmspolicy choice.
Let J (x) be the expected prot of rm with a long-term contract, that is,
J (x) = (x  wa (x)) +  (1  ) J (x)
where a 2 fL; SLg and (1  ) is the probability that the worker matched will
survive to the next period and wa (x) is the long-term wage that, by hypothesis,
is posted by rms and that workers either take it or leave it.
Moreover, let L denote the expected discounted payo¤ of a rm searching
to ll a vacancy with a policy L, With probability (1   q), it does not and it
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will try again to match next period. If the rm decides to o¤er directly a LTC








where L is he (measurable) subset of workers accepting the contract.
And, let SL denote the expected discounted payo¤ of a rm searching to






















(notice that, by continuity of the distribution function, single points have zero
probability of occurrence).
The rst term is the one-period expected prot from a short-term job, as
the contract will be accepted by workers of the subset SL; the second term
is the expected prot from an extension to a long-term contract, which occurs
only for types in the subset SL; the third term collects all cases in which the
rm supplies again a short-term contract, either because the the matching was
unsuccessful, or because the short-term contract was rejected, or because the
rm refuses to extend the contract to a long-run position.
If the rm chooses to start with a STC, a = SL; during the probationary
stage, it will learn the workers type. In this stage, the worker will receive a
short-term wage: wO. In period 2, the rm will propose a LTC only to the
workers in the subset SL. Given that the rm learns the workers type, future
wages will be contingent on the workers type: wa = wSL(x).
The rm maximizes its prots by choosing policy SL if SL  L, otherwise
policy L will be optimal.
6We will assume this wage is is exogenously given. The last section of the paper will
summarize the result for the case when ms also post w0.
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3 Optimal contract choice
We study the optimal contract choice in four steeps:
A) we determine the subset of workers (L; SL) accepting the contract
proposition. To this scope we need to determine the wages;
B) we determine the subset of workers (SL) accepted by rm after a short-
term contract;
C) we determine the unemployment rates;
D) we nd the optimal contract choice.
3.1 Wage posting
The prot maximizing rm chooses the wage subject to Wa(x)  Va(x), with
a 2 fL; SLg. Since the rm has no incentive to o¤er to the worker anything over
and above the minimum required to make him to accept its o¤er (see Diamond
(1971)), this condition reduces to
Wa = Va: (8)
Lets rst consider an (L) policy. In this simple wage setting set-up, the
condition (8), where WL is given by (3) and VL is given by (2), implies that
wL is driven to the workers reservation wage:
wL(x) = b(x) = x: (9)
Notice that wL is type-contingent. This implies that subset of workers ac-
cepting the contract, L;is the full support [0; 1]. Also, observe that, even with
type-contingent wages, rms would rather hire high productivity (and highly
paid) workers because, per period, their prots are (1  )x:
Let consider the an (SL) policy. The condition (8), where WSL is given
by (4) and VL is given by (2), immediately implies that the long-term wage
associated with SL is7





1 + (1  ) (10)
Proposition 1 Under the maintained assumptions, given wO; all the workers
with x 2 (x+; 1] always reject the STC. For all the workers with x 2 [0; x+),
wO  wSL(x)  b(x), where x+ = wO :
Proof To establish the rst claim, observe that workers with x 2 SL will
accept a SL if and only if (wO + (1  )WSL(x)) > WSL(x) where WSL(x)
and VSL are implicitly given by (4) and (2). By (10), the previous inequality
is satised if and only if wO > b(x) = x. Hence, all the workers with x 2
(x+; 1];with x+ = wO , will always reject the short-term contract.
Given that, for all the workers accepting the SL; wO > b(x); the second
claim follows immediately from (10):
This result is of some interest. Due to the assumption b(x) = x, when wO
is exogenous, high productivity workers will reject short-term contracts, unless
wO is su¢ ciently high. However, high levels of wO also imply high levels of
wSL(x): This trade-o¤ may make STC less protable than LTC. The result is
coherent with the wage formation theories suggesting that temporary workers
are paid more than workers in long-term contract to compensate them for the
less advantageous characteristics of temporary jobs. Moreover, in our model,
the long-term wage obtained after a short-term contract (i.e., after the rm
observes the type of the worker) is not driven to the workers reservation wage.
This is because, for the workers, the STC is an outside option: If the long-term
wage is equal to the reservation wage, the worker will reject the rms proposal
and wait for the next STC proposal.
3.2 Search equilibrium in the STC case
Knowing that only workers with x 2 [0; x+) will always accept the short-term
contract, the rms strategy in the SL policy is to engage after the probationary
stage only workers in the set SL. Hence, for the stationary strategy prole
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(SL), we dene the expected payo¤ of a rm as SL. We focus on equilibria in
undominated strategies, rm accepts a worker of type x if and only if JSL(x) >
ESL.





















[1 +qE q2(1 )] , while x
+ =
wO
 , E is the probability to meet a worker in the set [0; x
+), C = 1 +q(1 )1+q(1 )
and D = q(1 )wO1+q(1 ) .
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 characterizes the search equilibrium in the case of STCs. In
this equilibrium, rms partition workers who have accepted the short-term con-
tract, into two subintervals, hiring forever only workers whose ability is above
the threshold x .8
An increase in wO has a double e¤ect on the economy. First, given that
x+ = wO , it increases the proportion of workers accepting a STC (and this has
a positive e¤ect on E): Second, it pushes up the long-term wage wSL, as we
can see from (10).
To better understand this result, it is instructive to consider a simple exam-
ple, where abilities are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], N = M , q =  = 0:8,
 = 0:5,  = 0:8, and  = 0:05. The next gure shows how the inter-
val of workers accepting and accepted in the long-term job (i.e., with x 2
[(x+)  (x )]) varies with wO.
8Remember, however, that all the workers with x 2 (wo


















Figure 1: The interval of workers accepting/accepted in the long-term job
If wO is low, the rst one of the two e¤ects discussed above dominate the
second: only some workers accept a STC (x+ is low). On the other hand, rms
are not very selective in screening the workers (x  is low). When wO is higher,
the opposite is true: x+ takes a value near 1 (i,e., every worker accepts the
STC), and x  is also high (because the long-term wage is so high that rms
only nd protable to engage highly qualied workers).
3.3 Unemployment
In order to determine the unemployment rate, under the SL policy, we shell
consider unemployment rates for workers with x  x  (similarly for utx <x<x+
and utxx+). Also, lets index with p
t
SL the proportion of workers engaged in a
STC.









because a fraction  of the unemployed who survive (with a probability (1 ))
at t is expected to get a job, a fraction  of them is expected to die and to be
replaced by a fraction  of the work force with x 2 [x ; x+] (these individuals are
necessarily unemployed in the rst period of their life, given the time structure
of the model).
Hence, the unique stationary state occurs at
ux <x<x+ =

(1  ) +  (11)
and
px <x<x+ = ux <x<x+(1  ): (12)
Similarly, for workers with x < x , the dynamics is described by.
ut+1x<x  = u
t





The di¤erence with respect to the previous case reects the share of people
employed at t in a STC that, given that x < x , become unemployed (if still
alive) at (t+ 1) :
Hence, the unique stationary state is described by
ux<x  =

2(1  ) +  (13)
px<x  = ux<x (1  ) (14)
Obviously, the unemployment rate of the workers with x > x+, is always 1,
because they never accept to work.
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Total unemployment is:
uSL = F (x
+   x )ux <x<x+ + F (x )ux<x  + F (1  x+) (15)
with a percentage p = F (x+   x )px <x<x+ + F (x )px<x  of workers are
engaged in a one period contract.
Substituting (11) and (13) in (15), we nd the value of the total unemploy-
ment:
uSL = 1  (1  )
(1  ) + 

F (x+)  (1  )




where the endogenous values x+ and x  are given respectively the Proposition
1 and by Proposition 2.
Looking again at the numerical example above (see Figure 2), the unemploy-
ment rate is decreasing in wO if wO < . After this point it starts increasing.
When wO = , x+ = 1, and so all the agents accept the temporary employment
proposition. After this point, the increase of the short and, consequently, of the
long-term wages pushes the rms to hire permanently only the most productive













Figure 2: Unemployment, Employment and Temporary Employment
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We now turn to the analysis of the unemployment rate with the strategy L.
Given the strategy L, utL is expected to evolve according to:
ut+1L = u
t
L(1  )(1  ) + :
Hence, a stationary state occurs if and only if
uL =

(1  )+  (17)
It easy to check that uL  uSL. This is because, in policy SL, rms screen
workers and engage long-term term only workers in the interval (x ; x+). On
the contrary, if a = L, this interval is the full support [0; 1].
4 Choice of the contract
Studying now the optimal contract choice: Policy SL is an optimal contract if
SL > L, where ESL is dened in Appendix 1 by the equation (22), and,
EL may be rewritten; from the equation (6) above, as:
L =
q(1  )(1  ) R 1
0
xf(x)dx
[1  (1  )] [1  (1  q)]
Looking again at the numerical example (see gure 3), a = SL is the rms
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Figure 3: Firmsoptimal contract choice
For wO less than , the more qualied workers will refuse to work. For wO
near , all qualied workers accept a short-term contract. This value of wO
implies an high level of wSL but the high wages are compensated because rms
can screen the workers in the rst period. For wO near 1, the screening cannot
compensate the high wages and STC is suboptimal.
5 Welfare
We dene welfare in terms of the present discounted value of output. The social
planner is not interested in wages, since wages determine only the distribution
of output and, by assumption, distributional considerations are excluded from
the social welfare function. In our model, the critical issue is the rmspolicy
choice. We need to check if and when a SL policy can be optimal for both the
rms and the social planner. We dene as 
a the welfare value with a = SL;L.

















where uL is given by (17).
























where x  < x < x+ is given by (11), while ux<z is given by (13) and (14). In
each period, only workers with type x  < x < x+ will be hired on LTC. On the
contrary, workers with x < x  will be hired exclusively on STC.




Obviously the result depends upon the distribution F (:) and the values of
the parameters.









Figure 4: Welfare Comparison
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In our numerical example (see gure 4), an SL policy is optimal when the
short-term wage is xed at a value su¢ ciently high, so that x+ = 1, i.e., so
that all the workers enter the market for temporary jobs. In this case, the
higher unemployment rate coming from the rmsscreening is compensated by
the higher productive e¢ ciency. Workers in the subset [0; x ) will be always
rejected by rms after the short-term contract. These workers will have a higher
unemployment rate, nevertheless in the short-term relation they will obtain a
wage wO larger then their productivity.
6 Posted short-term wage
Lets now assume that the rm can also post the wage of the STC. The as-
sociated long-term wage is given by equation (9). When rms meet a worker
for the rst time, they dont know the type. We assume that the rm can
choose to o¤er a (short-term) two-part wage. This wage would be wO =
[ ~w(x) + (w(x)  ~w(x))], where ~w(x) is the xed component, while w(x) is con-
tingent upon the type of the worker (that the rm will discover just at the
end of the period). Hence, the rm will pay a salary w(~x) independent of the
worker type, and, at the end of the period (after learning the type), it will
pay a "bonus" equal to the di¤erence between the workers type and x; i.e.,
[w(x)  ~w(x)]. From the proof of Lemma 1, it follows that a worker will accept
a STC only if the expected utility of accepting this proposal is larger than the






> V SLx .
Clearly, at the equilibrium, given that types are distributed on [0; 1], the
equilibrium value of ~w(x) will be 0 and w(x) = x. Hence, wages on long-term
contracts (signed after the trial stage) and short-term wage are both driven to
the workers reservation wage:
wSL = wO = b(x) (21)
Notice that, with a two-part wage, all the workers (also the high productivity
ones with x 2 (wO ; 1]) will enter the short-term market.
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The main result for the case of endogenous short-term wage is summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When wO is endogenous, rms only hire workers in the interval
















Proof. See Appendix 2.
If wO is endogenous, as we have seen wSL = wO (see eq. (21) above). In this
case, every worker accepts a short-term contract o¤er, i.e. e = 1. Moreover,
rms will select only the agents in the subset (z; 1] for the long term work
relation.
Looking again at the numerical example above, we nd that usl = 29%,
p = 4; 7% and z = 0; 46. Compared to the case of endogenous wO, the rate
unemployment is lower only when wO is close to . Moreover, we nd that
a = SL is always optimal.
For the case of uniform distribution on [0; 1]; it is straightforward to check
that total welfare always attains a maximum with policy L. With a SL policy,
rms screen workers. The screening process has a negative e¤ect on unemploy-
ment and this generates a higher search cost. This e¤ect could be compensated
from the viewpoint of the workers on short-term contracts, because wO > wL
However, by denition, this is irrelevant from a social welfare viewpoint.
We can conclude that the introduction of a temporary market can be optimal
only if the short-term wage is xed exogenously at a value su¢ ciently high.
The assumption of posted short-term wage modies social welfare only as
far as 
SL, as the value 
L is independent of wO. This simplies the welfare
comparison between the two regimes. In particular, according to our simulations
(see gure 4), the regime with xed short-term wage dominates, in terms of




Appendix 1: Search Equilibrium on the SL policy with wO
exogenous
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, observe that the set X of workers that the rm accepts in SL contract
is always an interval (z; 1]; some z. Indeed, by the denition of undominated
equilibrium, x1 (1 ) > E
SL(x). Hence for any x0 > x; x
0
1 (1 )  ESL.
When wO is xed exogenously, by Proposition1, all the workers with x 2
(wO ; 1] will always reject the STC.
























































+ = wO , E is the probability to meet
a worker in the set [0; x+).
C = 1 +(1 )1+(1 ) and D =
(1 )wO
1+(1 ) .
The rst-order conditions with respect to x  are given by
 x f(x )Cq2(1 )2(1 (1 ))







































1   + qE   q2(1  )
(23)
To check that the solution is unique, observe that the left-hand side of equa-
tion (23) is increasing in x , with range (0,1). On the other hand, the right-hand





























[1 +qE q2(1 )] . Hence there exists a unique so-
lution to (23).
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Appendix 2: Search Equilibrium on the SL policy with wO
endogenous
Proof of Proposition 3.

























with wSL = wO = x:
The rst-order conditions with respect to z are given by
 zf(z)q2(1 )2(1 )
24(1  (1  ))




























To check that the solution is unique, observe that the left-hand side of equa-
tion (24) is increasing in z, with range (0,1). On the other hand, the right-hand
side of equation (24) is decreasing in z, falling from
q
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